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'Locked-In' to Their Decisions: Investigating
How the States Govern Revocation of
Advance Directives and How Three States
Make Revocation Impossible for People with
Locked-In Syndrome
by PETER C. HARMAN*

I.

Introduction:

On December 28, 1995, Jean-Dominique Bauby woke up in a
hospital unable to move, unable to speak.' The doctors, nurses-even
his loved ones-spoke to each other about him as if he was not there.2
His caretakers and family tried to talk to him, but he could not
respond. Eventually, they noticed that he was able to blink one
eyelid in response. Elated, they brought in a specialist to facilitate
communication. 4 "What do you want?" they asked.
His first
communication in weeks was a one-word answer: "Death."6
In recent years, much thought has been given to how to best
implement the wishes of patients with traumatic brain injuries, like
Terri Schiavo. In some cases, like Schiavo's, the debate is over which
family member can make the decisions that best reflect what the

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2011; B.A.,
Psychology, Colorado College, 2005. The author would like to thank the editors and staff
of HSTLJ for their continuing dedication and hard work.
1. THE DIVING BELL AND THE BUTTERFLY (Miramax Films 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Schindler v. Schiavo (In re Schiavo), 780 So. 2d 176, 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d
Dist. 2001).
[193]
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patient would have wanted.' Since the late 1970s, most states have
enacted laws that allow people to set out their preferences for health
care decisions in advance directives, in case the person becomes
incapacitated or loses the ability to communicate her preferences.
The advance directive statutes give people the opportunity to make
those important choices in advance, while they still have the mental
acuity to make well-informed decisions. Importantly, these statutes
also allow the declarant to change her mind in the future, either by
revoking the advance directive or by modifying her previously
expressed preferences. That way, if circumstances change, or if
unexpected situations arise, the advance directive documents are
flexible. The key to these documents is that when the person loses
the ability to make those decisions, her choices are set so that no
other person can make contrary decisions unless they are specifically
authorized to do so.
There is, however, one class of people who still have one
hundred percent of their mental faculties, but have lost the
opportunity to change their minds about their advance directives.
People who have locked-in syndrome are catastrophically paralyzed;
they often can only communicate by blinking."o While each state
treats the revocation and modification of advance directives
differently, some states make it more difficult than others for lockedin patients to legally change their minds. Some states even make it
impossible.
If Mr. Bauby had executed an advance directive requiring the
doctors to prolong his life by any means possible, would he have been
able to change his directive? More chillingly, if he had requested in
his advance directive to have life support removed after several
months, and now wanted to continue living by any means possible,
could he change his mind then? In the United States, those answers
would depend upon the state in which state Mr. Bauby lived."
Advance directives often enshrine what are literally life-anddeath decisions, including when to remove life support. In several
states, a locked-in patient would not be able to comport with the
8. In re Schiavo, 780 So. 2d at 178.
9. Gregory Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 737,
740 n.122 (1987).
10. Steven Laureys et al., Brain Function in Coma, Vegetative State, and Related
Disorders,3 LANCET NEUROLOGY, no. 9, 2004 at 537, 539.
11. Mr. Bauby did eventually choose to prolong his life. He wrote a memoir entirely
by blinking and he lived for 15 more months, just long enough to see his book published.
Diving Bell, supra note 1.
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formalities required to modify or revoke an advance directive, even if
the directive ordered the doctors to halt life-sustaining procedures.
The revocation statutes in those states discriminate against people
with locked-in syndrome because people who are locked-in are not
able to employ normal means of communication. The statutes in
those states violate the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and

must be changed. 12
A. Locked-In Syndrome
Locked-in syndrome is a mental state in which a patient is awake
and aware of his surroundings, but due to total or near-total paralysis
is unable to move or speak.
The condition is usually caused by
trauma to the pons area of the brainstem, which acts as a relay for
motor signals traveling between the brain and the body.14
Locked-in syndrome is distinguishable from other states of
mental incapacity. Clinicians often categorize severe traumatic brain
injury into four subgroups: coma, vegetative state, minimally
conscious state, and locked-in syndrome. Comatose individuals are
"neither awake nor aware."" Individuals in a vegetative state may
exhibit some arousal and responsiveness, but "have no ability to
interact with their environment."" A vegetative state is considered
persistent if it lasts longer than two months and is considered
permanent if it persists for longer than two years. An individual in a
minimally conscious state exhibits more environmental interaction
than a person in a vegetative state; a minimally conscious individual
can "demonstrate[] inconsistent awareness of [himself] and [his]
environment." 9 In contrast to the first three subcategories, patients
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2010).
13.

LOCKED-IN SYNDROME, MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, http://

www.merriam-webster.com/medical/lockedinsyndrome (last visited Sept. 12, 2010).
14. John B. Oldershaw, et al., Persistent Vegetative State: Medical, Ethical, Religious,
Economic and Legal Perspectives, I DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 495, 497 (1997); MARK
F. BEAR ET AL., NEUROSCIENCE: EXPLORING THE BRAIN 186-87 (2d ed. 2001).

15. Some sources, such as Tovino and Winslade also include akinetic mutism in this
group, while others such as Laureys et al. do not. Akinetic mutism is not discussed in this
paper for the sake of clarity. Stacey A. Tovino & William J. Winslade, A Primer on the
Law and Ethics of Treatment, Research, and Public Policy In the Context of Severe
Traumatic Brain Injury, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 12 (2005); Laureys et al., supra note 10,

at 539.
16. Tovino & Winslade, supra note 15, at 12.
17. Id.

18. Id. at 12-13.
19. Id. at 13.
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with locked-in syndrome retain consciousness and self-awareness but
are completely paralyzed, sometimes able to move their eyes or
digits. 2() Thus, a locked-in patient whose mental faculties are intact
retains a level of sensory perception and thought of a completely
different order of magnitude than a patient in one of the three other
categories. The most troubling aspect of locked-in syndrome, though,
is the physical similarity of its symptoms to those of the vegetative
state and the problems raised in trying to differentiate between
vegetative and locked-in patients.'
Dr. Adrian Owen described a patient who was the victim of a
traffic accident. 2 Five months after the accident, the patient
remained in a vegetative state according to standardized clinical
assessment; the doctors considered her unable to interact with the
environment, with severely limited cognitive ability.2 In spite of the
patient's diagnosis, Dr. Owen attempted to detect awareness in her
brain using sophisticated neuroimaging devices. Dr. Owen's team
was able to document that the patient understood verbal commands
and was able to respond to them, even though under standardized
diagnostic procedures she was vegetative. 2' Dr. Owen concluded that
while the patient, to all outward appearances and in line with the
standard diagnostic procedures, was in a vegetative state, she in fact
exhibited awareness that would put her squarely in the realm of
locked-in syndrome. Her mental faculties were worlds beyond what
would be expected of someone who actually was vegetative-her
cognitive reactions were indistinguishable from a healthy person's. 26
This difference in diagnosis changes the patient from a person
who cannot make reasoned decisions about her health care to one
who can and should, but is simply unable to communicate those
decisions to anyone else. Some locked-in patients are able to

20. Tovino & Winslade, supra note 15, at 13-14.
21. Laureys et al., supra note 10, at 542 ("EEG and evoked potentials do not reliably
distinguish the locked-in syndrome from the vegetative state").
22. Radio Lab: After Life (WNYC radio broadcast July 27, 2009), available at

http://www.radiolab.org/2009/jul/27/. See also, Adrian Owen, et al., Detecting Awareness in
the Vegetative State, 313 SCIENCE Sept. 8, 2006 at 1402.

23. After Life, supra note 22. See also, Owen, et al., supra note 22 ("No evidence of
any awareness").
24. After Life, supra note 22. See also, Owen, et al., supra note 22.
25. After Life, supra note 22. See also, Owen, et al., supra note 22.
26. After Life, supra note 22. See also, Owen, et al., supra note 22.
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communicate by blinking or moving an extremity,2 but some, like Dr.
Owen's patient, are unable to communicate through any traditional

means.
Locked-in syndrome has received significant media attention
after the release of a study analyzing the misdiagnosis of patients with
disorders of consciousness and recent advances in communication
with such patients.28 In the study, attention was brought to Rom
Houben, a Belgian man who was diagnosed as vegetative after a car
accident in 1983.29
Twenty-three years later, doctors, using
neuroimaging devices, were astounded to find that he had been
conscious and aware the entire time." Unable to communicate with
his family or caregivers for over two decades, Houben is now able to
"speak" using special computer operated by one finger.1
B. New Technology Aids Locked-In Patients
New technology is emerging that radically changes the way that
doctors can diagnose and communicate with locked-in patients. New
methods are being developed that will allow for more accurate
diagnosis of a patient's mental condition.32
The recent media
attention given to locked-in syndrome, while focusing on the story of
Rom Houben, was sparked by the publication of a study showing that
up to four in ten patients diagnosed as vegetative show some signs of
consciousness (though most in this group would be classified as
minimally conscious).3 According to the author of the study, these
27. See, e.g., Tovino & Winslade, supra note 15, at 13-14. See also, Kate Holmquist,
Locked-In Syndrome is Like Wearing a Straitjacket, THE IRISH TIMES, Jan. 2, 2010 at 7.

("Kathleen would look at the ceiling if it was true and close her eyes if it was not....
Using one finger on her left hand, she uses predictive text on a DynaVox box like the one
used by Stephen Hawking.").
28. Caroline Schnakers, et al., Diagnostic Accuracy of the Vegetative and Minimally
Conscious State: Clinical Consensus Versus Standardized Neurobehavioral Assessment,
9:35 BMC NEUROLOGY *1 (2009). See Malcolm Ritter, Vegetative Man Communicates
Using Thoughts, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010
/02/04/vegetative-man-communicat n 449044.html. See also, Mark Tutton, ParalyzedMan

'Turns Thoughts into Sounds', CNN (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/
12/1 6/brain.computer.speech/.index.html?iref=allsearch; Brandon Kleim, Wireless Brain to
Computer ConnectionSynthesizes Speech, WIRED, (2009), http://www.wired.com/wired

science/2009/12/wireless-brain/.
29. See Ritter, supra note 28.
30. See id.
31. See id.

32. Owen, et al., supra note 22.
33. Schnakers, et al., supra note 28 (Forty-one percent of patients with disorders of
consciousness were erroneously assigned a diagnosis of vegetative state).
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misdiagnoses could lead to "grave consequences, especially in end-oflife decision-making."

34

In a 2006 Science article, Dr. Adrian Owen, et al., described a
new technique using functional brain imaging devices to detect
awareness in patients diagnosed as vegetative.' By looking directly at
the brain's energy use, Owen's team was able to detect responses to
verbal commands from patients originally diagnosed as vegetative.
But even this test is not all-encompassing: Dr. Owen made clear that
while this type of test can show that a patient is "aware," it cannot
prove that a patient is "unaware.", The groundwork is now in place
to use this technology not only to more accurately diagnose disorders
of consciousness like locked-in syndrome, but to communicate with
patients who otherwise would have no means of communication.
In a recent New England Journal of Medicine article, a team of
European doctors successfully used this technology to communicate
with a supposedly vegetative patient. 9
The patient correctly
answered five of six yes or no questions; his answers were adduced by
analyzing activity in discrete areas of the brain, as in Dr. Owens'
study above. 4 1' This new method represents a functional, if
rudimentary, way of first double-checking whether a vegetative
diagnosis is accurate and then providing an avenue of
communication-one that did not exist even a few years ago.
Advances are also being made using "Brain-Computer
Interface," which allows a locked-in patient to use thoughts to type
messages or even turn thoughts directly into computer-generated
34. Schnakers, et al., supra note 28.
35. Owen, et al., supra note 22.

36. The "vegetative" patient was verbally instructed to imagine playing tennis or to
imagine walking through her home when prompted. These two tasks activate distinct
regions of the brain (the supplemental motor area for the "tennis" prompt and the
parahippocampal gyrus, posterior parietal cortex, and lateral premotor cortex for the
"house" prompt). The patient's responses were "indistinguishable" from those of healthy
control subjects who were given the same instructions and prompts. Owen, et al., supra
note 22.
37. For example, if a patient was deaf, but otherwise mentally intact, a verbal
command would not elicit any response if the patient could not hear the command. See
After Life, supra note 22.
38. Adrian Owen & Martin Coleman, Using Neuroimaging to Detect Awareness in
Disorders of Consciousness, 23(4) FUNCTIONAL NEUROLOGY 189, 189 (2008). See Martin
Monti, et al., Willfull Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of Consciousness, 362
NEW ENG. J. MED. 579, 579 (2010).

39. Monti, et al., supra note 38.
40. The one question not answered correctly was not answered incorrectly; rather, the
brain activity indicated it was not answered at all. Id. at 585.
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speech. 4 ' This new technology allows a locked-in patient, even one
who cannot move a digit or his eyes, to make "verbal" statements and

also to produce written documents a computer.
C.

Advance Directives

An advance directive, or living will, is a document that allows a
person (the principal or declarant) to express, in a legally binding
fashion, his preferences for medical care should he later become
incompetent or unable to communicate; one may also name a
surrogate decisionmaker or agent in an advance directive. 4 2 State
laws regulate advance directives.43 An important aspect of the
advance directive document is that it must be able to be modified or
revoked if the principal so chooses. A principal may choose to
change the named surrogate decisionmaker, he may choose to change
his expressed treatment preferences, or he may choose to revoke the
document altogether.
Considering that advance directives can be executed without the
advice of an attorney or other specialist, the patient executing the
advance directive may not take into consideration every possible
contingency.44 Take, for instance, a person in Bauby's situation,
above. Locked-in syndrome may bring with it a set of circumstances
that the patient had not considered when drafting the advance
directive. If the subjective experience of the condition was such that
the patient could no longer bear the suffering, that patient might wish
to modify his advance directive so as to allow the removal of lifesustaining procedures. On the other hand, a patient might, while he is
healthy, think that he would not want life-prolonging procedures after
a catastrophic accident. The patient, like Bauby eventually did, might
decide after the accident that he wants to continue living by any
means possible. 4 5 This would bring about a nightmarish situation in
which the patient wishes to continue living, but has an effective legal
document that instructs the physicians to allow him to die. In that
situation particularly, it is absolutely imperative that the patient be

41. Tutton, supra note 28. See also, Kleim, supra note 28.
42. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, advance directive (8th ed. 2004).
43. See discussion, infra Part 1l.
44. See, e.g., Office of the Attorney General of California, Advance Healthcare
Directive: What's Importantto You, (2010), http://www.ag.ca.gov/consumers/general/adv
bc-dir.php (California attorney general's site containing information to self-execute
advance directives, including a "fill-in-the-blank" form).
45.

DIVING BELL, supra note 1.
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able to modify or revoke a previously executed advance directive-it
is literally a life-or-death situation. 6

D. The Function of Formalities in Executing Advance Directives
Formalities are necessary for an advance directive to be validly
executed; they are what the declarant or others must do to make the
document legally effective.47
Required formalities can include
witnesses, notarization, or other requirements such as a signed
writing. 48 Formalities associated with revoking advance directives
serve several purposes. 4 9 The purposes of formalities fall into four
general categories: (1) ritual/cautionary function, (2) evidentiary
function, (3) protective function, and (4) channeling function.'o
The ritual/cautionary function of formalities seeks to assure that
the declarant is aware of the gravity of his action and "preclude[] the
possibility that the testator was acting in a casual or haphazard
fashion."" The evidentiary function of formalities increases the
reliability of proof of the declarant's intention in executing the
document-a written document is a more stable embodiment of the
declarant's intent than an oral statement.5'2 The protective function
assures that there is no coercion or undue influence underpinning the
document's execution."
Finally, the channeling function of

46. For the purposes of this paper, statutes that allow a declarant to revoke a
directive, those that allow one to modify a directive, and those that allow one to do both
are grouped together because both revocation and modification allow a declarant to
nullify previously decided upon treatment decisions. Analysis of the issues raised when
the patient can revoke, but not modify, a directive is important, but beyond the scope of
this paper. To put it succinctly: if a patient is only allowed to revoke a directive, the
treatment decisions would revert to statutory defaults after revocation; they may not align

with the patient's preferred treatment options but the patient, due to the formalities of
execution, would likely not be able to execute a new directive while he or she is locked-in.
47. See Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous
Transfers, 51 YALE L. J. 1, 3 (1941).
48. Gelfand, supra note 9, at 756; COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-109 (2009).
49. Because formalities in the context of wills have been studied more closely than in
those relation to advance directives, and they serve the same purposes, looking to the
function of formalities in wills will inform their use in advance directives.
50. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES 22325 (6th ed. 2000) (quoting Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 47, at 5-10; John H. Langbein,
Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 494 (1975)).
51. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 47, at 5-6; Gelfand, supra note 9, at 767.
52. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 47, at 6-9; Gelfand, supra note 9, at 767.
53. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 47, at 6-13.
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formalities serves to standardize the "organization, language, and
content" of the documents.54

Professor Gregory Gelfand argued that formalities applicable to
the execution of advance directives are no less applicable in the
revocation or modification of them." Gelfand contended that in
order to avoid the exact pitfalls that formalities of execution serve to
prevent, they should be applied equally to revocation and execution.
Formalities do indeed serve important functions in protecting the
true intent of the declarant, but they can also serve to hinder that
intent. Gulliver and Tilson warn that formalities of execution "surely
should not be revered as ends in themselves, enthroning formality
over frustrated intent."' Dogmatic adherence to the strictures of
formality can easily frustrate the intent of a declarant when his
intention is clear and undisputed but some defect in execution injures
the validity of the document."
Therefore, while formalities in
execution do serve important purposes, their utility decreases
dramatically when they serve to frustrate the declarant's intent.
E. The Goal of this Note
A locked-in patient deserves all of the rights and protections
available to every mentally competent American." Misdiagnosis may
rob the patient of the opportunity to assert those rights because a
patient misdiagnosed as vegetative will be assumed to not have
awareness or independent thought. Technology is indeed emerging
that would allow a totally paralyzed person to communicate using
instruments that analyze brain function,' but in some jurisdictions
that sort of communication may not be sufficient for a patient to
legally change his advance directive.'
This paper seeks to analyze how state laws currently dictate
whether a locked-in patient may revoke or modify a medical advance
directive. Because a locked-in patient is at an extreme end of the

54. Langbein, supra note 50.
55. Gelfand, supra note 9, at 768.
56. Id.

57. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 47.
58. For a classic example of frustrated intent because of an admitted technicality, see
Groffman v. Groffman(1969) 2 ALL E.R. 108 (P.).
59. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
60. Monti, et al., supra note 38; Tutton, supra note 28.
61. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-109 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN.
604 (West 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-106 (2010).

§ 5-
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spectrum of physical communicative ability, the locked-in state serves
as a useful lens through which to analyze how the law treats
differently individuals who have some difficulty in communicating
with others, even though their mental faculties are fully intact. By
analyzing the laws through the viewpoint of one in a locked-in state, a
clear light can be shed upon the law's differential treatment of those
*
*
*62
with communicative disabilities.

II. Survey of the States
Forty-eight states approve of the use of advance directives by
statute . The statutes elucidate the procedures required to validly
modify or revoke an advance directive.64 These statutory procedures
can be grouped into three main frameworks: the Majority Approach,
the Third Party Approach (which has two subdivisions), and the
Principal-Only Approach. There are also two other characteristics of
these revocation statutes that the states address differently, but their
full analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
62. For the purposes of this paper, the author defines a communicative disability as
one where a person has some degree of difficulty in communicating with others; generally
in that they do not have the ability to speak or to write or type, but they have
undiminished mental capacity for thought and reason.
In other words, locked-in
syndrome is the epitome of a condition causing communicative disability, but
communicative disabilities may affect others who are not necessarily locked-in.
63. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-5 (2010); ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.020 (2010); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-3202 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-204 (2009); CAL. PROB. CODE §
4695 (West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-109 (2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-579a
(2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2504 (2010); FLA. STAT. § 765.104 (2009); GA. CODE
ANN. § 31-32-6 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327E-4 (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4511
(2009); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/5 (2010); IND. CODE § 16-36-4-12 (2009); IOWA CODE §
144A.4 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,104 (2008); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.627
(West 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.4 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A,
§ 5-803 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-604 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. §
145B.09 (2009); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-207 (2009); Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.020 (2009);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-104 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-406 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 449.620 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:15 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-57
(West 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-3 (2009); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 2985 (Consol.
2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-07 (2009); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.04 (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3101.6 (2009); OR. REV.
STAT. § 127.545 (2007); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5444 (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.11-4
(2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-80 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-8 (2009);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-106 (2010); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.042
(West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-114 (2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9704 (2010);
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2985 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.040 (2010); W. VA.
CODE § 16-30-18 (2009); WIS. STAT. § 154.05 (2009); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-404
(2010). Massachusetts and Michigan do not explicitly authorize advance directives by
statute.
64. See supra note 63.
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A. The Three Major Frameworks

The most common statutory scheme allows a patient to modify
or revoke an advance directive "at any time and in any manner by the
declarant"'5 or "at any time and in any manner that communicates an
intent to revoke."" This is the broadest type of language and allows a
wide range of actions by a patient to validly revoke or modify an
advance directive. This language is used by a majority of states and is
also the framework adopted by the Uniform Health-Care Decisions
Act; it is followed by Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana,
Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. 9 This framework is the
"Majority Approach."
The second and third types of governing statutes usually list
several ways that an advance directive may be modified or revoked."'

65. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-579a(a) (2008).
66. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4695(b) (West 2009).
67. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 3(b), 9 (1993). The uniform act has been
adopted in Alabama, Alaska, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, New
Mexico, and Wyoming. U.L.A. HEALTH CARE DEC Refs & Annos (West 2009).
68. Louisiana is included in the majority because revocation can be effected by
nonverbal expression ... of the intent to revoke." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.4
(2010).
69. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.020 (2010); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3202 (2010);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-204 (2009); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4695 (West 2009); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 19a-579a (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2504 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. §
31-32-6 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327E-4 (2009); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/5 (2010);
IOWA CODE § 144A.4 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.4 (2010); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-803 (2009); MINN. STAT. § 145B.09 (2009); MISS. CODE ANN. §
41-41-207 (2009); Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.020 (2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-104 (2009);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-406 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.620 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
26:2H-57 (West 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-3 (2009); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 2985
(Consol. 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-07 (2009);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.04 (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3101.6 (2009); OR.
REV. STAT. § 127.545 (2007); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5444 (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 234.11-4 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-8 (2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9704
(2010); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-404 (2010).
70. See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-5 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-109 (2009); FLA.
STAT. § 765.104 (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4511 (2009); IND. CODE § 16-36-4-12
(2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,104 (2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.627 (West 2010);
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-604 (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:15
(2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-80 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-106 (2010); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.042 (West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-114
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The directives are generally revocable orally or in writing or by some
physical act that manifests an intention to revoke the document, such
as "being canceled, defaced, obliterated, burned, torn or otherwise
destroyed."" Seventeen jurisdictions fall under this broad category;
there is a very important split within these jurisdictions, though.
Fourteen of these jurisdictions allow a third party, acting at the
direction of the declarant, to effect the cancellation or modification of
the document. Most of these jurisdictions (Florida, Idaho, Indiana,
Kentucky, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin) require that the third party acting on
behalf of the declarant do so "in the presence" of the declarant.72
Four states (Alabama, Kansas, Utah, and West Virginia) do not
require the third party to perform the revoking act in the principal's
presence, but only require that they act at his "direction."" Whether
or not they require "presence," these seventeen jurisdictions are the
"Third Party" jurisdictions.
The remaining three states require the canceling act to be
performed by the principal to the directive. 4 Tennessee requires a
written statement signed by the principal or an oral statement made
by the principal. Maryland" and Colorado" similarly require oral or
(2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2985 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.040 (2010); W.
VA. CODE § 16-30-18 (2009); WIS. STAT. § 154.05 (2009).
71. WIS. STAT. § 154.05 (1)(a) (2009). See also ALA. CODE § 22-8A-5 (2010); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-18-109 (2009); FLA. STAT. § 765.104 (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 394511 (2009); IND. CODE § 16-36-4-12 (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,104 (2008); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.627 (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-604 (West
2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:15 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-80 (2009); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 32-11-106 (2010); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.042 (West
2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-114 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2985 (2009); WASH.
REV. CODE § 70.122.040 (2010); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-18 (2009).
72. FLA. STAT. § 765.104 (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4511 (2009); IND. CODE §
16-36-4-12 (2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.627 (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
137-J:15 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-80 (2009); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 166.042 (West 2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2985 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE §
70.122.040 (2010); WiS. STAT. § 154.05 (2009).
73. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-5 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,104 (2008); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2a-114 (2009); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-18 (2009). West Virginia provides for two
means of third party revocation: one requiring presence and the other not. W. VA. CODE
§ 16-30-18 (2009). Because West Virginia includes the more lenient method, it is grouped
with the "no presence required" states.
74. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-109 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-604
(West 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-106 (2010).
75. TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-106 (2010).
76. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-604(a) (West 2010).
77. COLO. REV. STAT.

§ 15-18-109

(2009).
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written expression and also accept a physical act by the declarant to
revoke an advance directive.
Colorado, for instance, allows
revocation "by the declarant orally, in writing or by burning, tearing,
canceling, obliterating, or destroying said declaration."" This most
restrictive approach is the "Principal-Only" approach.
B.

Other Jurisdictional Differences

Another jurisdictional split, apart from the above three major
frameworks, is that some jurisdictions only allow modification or
revocation of a directive if the declarant is competent or not
incapacitated, while others allow modification regardless of the
principal's mental state." Many states do not address capacity in this
context." Of the forty-eight states with statutes governing advance
directives, twenty-one"' allow a declarant to modify or revoke a
directive "regardless of the mental or physical condition of the
principal." 8 2 Ten of the jurisdictions explicitly require that a declarant
have capacity in order to validly modify or revoke an advance

78. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-18-109 (2009).
79. Compare CAL. PROB. CODE § 4695(b) (West 2009) ("A patient having capacity
may revoke . . ."), with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-579a(a) (2008) ("may be revoked ...
without regard to the declarant's mental or physical condition").
80. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-109 (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-6 (2009).
81. These states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North
Carolina; Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and
Washington. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-5 (2010); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3202 (2010);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-204 (2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-579a (2008); 755 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 35/5 (2010); IOWA CODE § 144A.4 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.58.4 (2010); MINN. STAT. § 145B.09 (2009); Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.020 (2009);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-104 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-406 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 449.620 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-57 (West 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321
(2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3101.6 (2009); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5444 (2009); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-4.11-4 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-106 (2010); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 166.042 (West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9704 (2010); WASH. REV.
CODE § 70.122.040 (2010).
82. 20 PA. CONS. STAT.

§ 5444 (2009).
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The remaining seventeen states do not specifically address

mental capacity in this context.8

A final feature of states' statutes regarding advance directives is
that in many cases there is a different procedure for revoking the
designation of an agent or surrogate for health care decisions." In
those cases, the procedure for revoking the designation of a proxy
decisionmaker is more circumscribed than the procedure to revoke a
directive."
For instance, in Alaska a declarant may revoke an
advance directive "in any manner that communicates an intent to
revoke," 8 7 but may only revoke the designation of an agent "by a
signed writing or by personally informing the supervising health care
provider."" In other jurisdictions, the same procedure can serve to
change an agent's designation as can be used to modify or revoke the
document."

III. Effects of the Three Existing Frameworks in Real-World
Settings
Each of the three frameworks of law (the Majority Approach,
the Third Party Approach, and the Principal-Only Approach) affects
a locked-in patient's ability to modify or revoke an advance directive
differently. The Majority Approach is the most forgiving scheme for
a patient with a communicative disability-the language is broad

83. These states are: Alaska, California, Delaware, Florida, Maine, New Mexico,
New York, Oregon, Virginia, and Wyoming. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.020 (2010); CAL.
PROB. CODE § 4695 (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2504 (2010); FLA. STAT. §
765.104 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-803 (2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A3 (2009); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 2985 (Consol. 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.545 (2007); VA.
CODE ANN. §54.1-2985 (2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-404 (2010).
84. These states are: Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maryland, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-109 (2009); GA.
CODE ANN. § 31-32-6 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327E-4 (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
39-4511 (2009); IND. CODE § 16-36-4-12 (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,104 (2008); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.627 (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-604 (West
2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-207 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:15 (2009);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-07 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.04 (West 2010);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-80 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-8 (2009); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2a-114 (2009); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-18 (2009); Wis. STAT. § 154.05 (2009).
85. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4695(b) (West 2009).
86. Compare, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4695(a) (West 2009), with PROB. § 4695(b).

87. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.020(b) (2010).
88. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.020(a) (2010).
89. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3202 (2010) ("A person may revoke his
own health care directive or disqualify a surrogate by doing any of the following: . . .").
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enough so that any means of communication by the patient is
sufficient to validly modify an advance directive, but this framework

dispenses with the safeguards of the formalities of execution. The
Third Party Approach still allows locked-in patients to modify and
revoke medical directives, but does not dispense with all of the
formalities of execution, though their functions are abrogated. The
Principal-Only Approach, on the other hand, keeps in place the
formalities to such an extent that a locked-in patient would not be
able to change a previously executed advance directive.
Full
exploration of the capacity and agency jurisdictional splits is beyond
the scope of this paper.
A. The Majority Approach
Thirty-one jurisdictions allow a declarant to revoke or modify an
advance directive by any means of effectively communicating that
intent (the Majority Approach).9o
By dispensing with most
formalities, these jurisdictions allow the broadest range of actions to
validly revoke or modify an advance directive. The statute in effect in
California is representative of the typical Majority Approach statute;
it follows the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act.91
California allows revocation "at any time and in any manner that
communicates an intent to revoke."92 This exceptionally broad
language eliminates any formalities associated with the revocation.
The "in any manner" language would allow a patient to revoke an
advance directive using any of the methods named in the other
statutes: oral or written notification or any of the physical methods
because those methods clearly express the intent to revoke. This
language also encompasses certain other avenues of communication
90. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.020 (2010); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3202 (2010);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-204 (2009); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4695 (West 2009); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 19a-579a (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2504 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. §
31-32-6 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327E-4 (2009); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/5 (2010);
IOWA CODE § 144A.4 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.4 (2010); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-803 (2009); MINN. STAT. § 145B.09 (2009); MISS. CODE ANN. §
41-41-207 (2009); Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.020 (2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-104 (2009);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-406 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.620 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
26:2H-57 (West 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-3 (2009); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 2985
(Consol. 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-07 (2009);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.04 (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3101.6 (2009); OR.
REV. STAT. § 127.545 (2007); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5444 (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 234.11-4 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-8 (2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9704
(2010); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-404 (2010).
91. U.L.A. HEALTH CARE DEC Refs & Annos (West 2009).
92. CAL. PROB. CODE

§ 4695(b)

(West 2009).
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that are important to locked-in patients, including communication by
blinking or communication which utilizes technology, including

specialized computers, brain-computer interface, and neuroimaging
devices.
The positive impact of this language is that people with
communicative disabilities will be able to modify or revoke their
advance directives so long as there is some possible method of
communication. The continuation or withholding of life-support
measures will likely be an important issue for the patient given his
precarious state of health and his difficulty in interacting with the
world.' As such, it is important for a locked-in patient to have the
legal ability to modify or revoke a previously executed advance
directive if that document no longer embodies the patient's current
desires regarding health care.
On the negative side, this type of statute dispenses with
practically all of the formalities associated with revoking and
modifying advance directives. As discussed above, formalities of
execution have important roles to play in assuring that the executed
document expresses the declarant's true intent, free from coercion
and duress. Most important in the case of revoking or modifying an
advance directive are the ritual, evidentiary, and protective functions
because a locked-in person is in a vulnerable position where being
taken advantage of could be a life-or-death situation.94
To completely eliminate formalities is to remove important
procedural safeguards.
Gelfand argues against the loosened
formalities associated with this approach." Gelfand, however, argued
this is based on the unfounded (or, looking to new developments in
technology, no longer true) assumption that all conscious patients will
be able to comply with every state's formalities, given enough time.96
While requiring strict formalities in modifying or revoking advance
directives serves important interests, those interests are moot if it
becomes impossible to comply with the formalities. The Majority
Approach, in putting the declarant's intent ahead of adherence to
formalities, gives locked-in patients such wide latitude in executing
their intent that they lose the protective functions of the formalities.

93. See, e.g., DIVING BELL, supra note I (discussing Bauby's wish for death and
subsequent reversal of that wish).
94. See Gelfand, supra note 9, at 768.
95. Id.

96. Gelfand, supra note 9, at 768 n.124 ("In a non-emergency situation, a conscious
patient can go through the formalities").
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The Third Party Approach

Fourteen jurisdictions allow a declarant to modify or revoke an
advance directive by directing a third party to make a written
revocation or to physically destroy or cancel the document (the Third
Party Approach).) All but four of these jurisdictions require that the
third party do so "in the presence of" the principal."
There is long-developed case law that defines "presence" in
regards to attestation of wills. 9 Given the similarities between a
witness attesting to a will and a third party acting on a declarant's
behalf to revoke an advance directive, case law defining "presence" in
the context of will formalities should be illustrative in the context of
using a third party to revoke or modify an advance directive. The
jurisprudence of the state of Virginia is instructive as a prototype for
jurisdictions that require the "presence" of a principal in this
situation.
Virginia allows for revocation by a "signed, dated writing" or "an
oral expression of intent to revoke.""") The statute also allows
"'physical cancellation or destruction" of the document by the
declarant or by "another in his presence and at his direction.""
Allowing a third party to act out a locked-in patient's will in changing
or revoking a directive gives a severely paralyzed person the ability to
abide by the required formalities through a proxy, thus effectuating
his intent without dispensing with the formalities. An interesting
wrinkle is added, though, because in many states, including Virginia,

97. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-5 (2010); FLA. STAT. § 765.104 (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
39-4511 (2009); IND. CODE § 16-36-4-12 (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,104 (2008); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.627 (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:15 (2009); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-77-80 (2009); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.042 (West
2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-114 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2985 (2009); WASH.
REV. CODE § 70.122.040 (2010); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-18 (2009); Wis. STAT. § 154.05
(2009).
98. FLA. STAT. § 765.104 (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4511 (2009); IND. CODE §
16-36-4-12 (2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.627 (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
137-J:15 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-80 (2009); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 166.042 (Vernon 2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2985 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE §
70.122.040 (2010); WIS. STAT. § 154.05 (2009).
99. See generally W.W. Allen, What Constitutes the Presence of the Testator in the
Witnessing of his Will, 75 A.L.R.2d 318 (2009).
100. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2985(A) (2009).
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2985(A)(ii) (2009).
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the person acting at the principal's direction must be "in his

presence." 102
Substantial case law has attempted to precisely define what is
meant by "presence."" In Virginia, the Statute of Wills requires
"'conscious presence"; this is distinguished from mere temporal and
physical proximity. 104 Conscious presence is not achieved if the
person whose presence is required is asleep or unconscious. o) The
testator must be conscious that the act is occurring at the time that the
act is in progressto be consciously present." Virginia law does raise a
presumption of presence if the act occurs in the same room as the
testator, barring evidence of fraud or incapacity.""
Thus, the conscious presence test established for attestation of
wills might be applied in the context of a locked-in patient seeking to
revoke an advance directive. An important consideration arises here
because it can be very difficult to determine whether a completely
locked-in patient is conscious or unconscious without using devices to
measure brainwaves.. If a patient is absolutely paralyzed, the only
way to adduce the mental state of the patient would be through
analyzing brain activity"o' or to ask the patient directly whether he was
awake and aware of the proceedings using one of the methods that
allows a locked-in patient to communicate. While the conscious
presence test poses an added hurdle to the process, it is an important
safeguard to assure that the patient's wishes are being accurately
fulfilled.
The main strength of the Third Party Approach is that it allows a
patient with a severe communicative disability to modify or revoke an
102. FLA. STAT. § 765.104 (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4511 (2009); IND. CODE
16-36-4-12 (2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.627 (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
137-:15 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 44-77-80

§
§

(2009); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

§ 166.042 (Vernon 2009); VA. CODE ANN.
70.122.040 (2010); Wis. STAT. § 154.05 (2009).

§

54.1-2985 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE §

103. See generally Allen, supranote 99.
104. Tucker v. Sandidge, 85 Va. 546, 570 (1888).
105. Id.; see also Baldwin v. Baldwin's Ex'r, 81 Va. 405, 410 (1886).
106. Nock v. Nock's Ex'rs, 51 Va. 106, 115 (1853); see also Baldwin, 81 Va. at 414.

107. Nock, 51 Va. at 119.
108. Because locked-in patients are severely paralyzed, wakefulness can only be
determined through communication, or by observing voluntary eye or digit movement, if
possible. However, a lack of communication or movement would not necessarily mean
that a patient is not awake. Monti, et al., supra note 38, at 585 ("Whether the patient fell
asleep during this question, failed to hear it, simply elected not to answer it, or lost
consciousness can not be determined.").
109. BEAR ET AL., supra note 14, at 616.
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advance directive. As with the Majority Approach, so long as there is
some method by which the patient can communicate with others, that

patient may direct another person to revoke or modify the document
on his behalf. As discussed above, health care decisions are crucial to
a patient with locked-in syndrome and that patient's preferences
might change over time. If the patient's wishes no longer comport
with the wishes expressed in the document, it is imperative that the
patient be able to change or revoke the directive. The Third Party
Approach, like the Majority Approach, effectively allows a locked-in
patient to modify or revoke an advance directive.
Additionally, the Third Party Approach preserves more of the
formalities associated with advance directives than does the Majority
Approach, while still allowing patients with communicative
disabilities to effect a modification or revocation. On the other hand,
the function of some of these formalities may be lost in having a third
party, rather than the principal, execute the formalities.
The
evidentiary function is still fulfilled, because, even if a third party
does the action, there will be record of it-either by a signed writing
or a physically cancelled document. The ritual function is served
somewhat, because an overt act is required of the third party, but the
true purpose of the ritual is to impress upon the declarant the gravity
of the action."
Filtering ritual formalities through a third party
dilutes the effect they would have had upon a declarant had he
performed the rituals himself.
Finally, the third purpose of
formalities, the protective function, is almost completely lost in this
situation. Allowing a third party to modify or revoke a person's
advance directive opens wide the gates for undue influence and fraud.
The relevant statutes in the Third Party states allow a person to
cancel an advance directive so long as he is in the declarant's presence
and acting at his direction; four states (Alabama, Kansas, Utah, and
West Virginia) do not require that the cancellation occur in the
declarant's presence."' These statutes do not even specify how the
declarant should signal his "direction."ll 2 A patient with severe

110. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 47, at 5-6.
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2985(A)(ii) (2009). See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-5 (2010);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,104 (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-114 (2009); W. VA.
CODE § 16-30-18 (2009).
112. See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-5; FLA. STAT. § 765.104 (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 394511 (2009); IND. CODE § 16-36-4-12 (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,104; KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 311.627 (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:15 (2009); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-77-80 (2009); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.042 (West 2009);
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communicative disability, like a locked-in patient, would be at the
mercy of third parties who could spuriously claim they were acting at
the direction of the patient. The protective function of the formalities
is entirely lost in Third Party states. Thus, the Third Party Approach
allows a locked-in patient to revoke or modify his advance directive
without dispensing with the formalities, but in allowing a third party
to act at the behest of the principal, the safeguards afforded by some
of the formalities are diminished or lost.
C.

The Principal-Only Approach

The statutory approach of three jurisdictions could make it
impossible for a locked-in patient to modify or terminate a previously
executed advance directive.1 1 States that employ the Principal-Only
approach require that the principal to the advance directive do some
physical act, such as speaking or writing, to revoke the document.
Consider a patient whose directive requires that the doctors
terminate life support after eighteen months. The directive states that
if, at the end of the eighteen months, the patient is still dependent on
a respirator or similar devices, life support shall be removed. If this
patient was locked-in but was making advances in communicating via
fMRI, brain-computer interface, or even by blinking in code, he may
express his desire to keep on living-to revoke his advance directive.
Unfortunately, this patient lives in Tennessee. The patient now
wishes to revoke the directive so he can continue living and working
toward recovery. He is allowed one of two procedures for the
revocation: he may submit to his physician a written, signed, and
dated document revoking the directive or he may orally revoke the
document to his physician.1 4 The patient, completely locked-in, can
neither hold a pen nor speak. According to the letter of the law in
Tennessee, the patient cannot change his advance directive-his
doctors would be bound to remove life support at the end of the
designated period.
The laws of the Principal-Only jurisdictions-Tennessee,
Colorado, and Maryland-are too restrictive. By requiring the
declarant to speak, sign his name, or perform some overt action (such

UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-114; VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2985 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.122.040 (2010); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-18; Wis. STAT. § 154.05 (2009).
113. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-109 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-604
(West 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-106 (2010).
114. TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 32-11-106

(2010).
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as "burning, tearing,... or destroying" the document"'), these laws
do not give completely paralyzed citizens the opportunity to change
their minds about previously ratified health care decisions, even when
their mental abilities are completely undiminished."'
This most
restrictive language takes the requirements of formalities so far as to
make them impossible for some people to fulfill.
The only advantage to this approach is that the formalities are
undiluted. But such slavish dogmatism goes so far as to make it
impossible to fulfill the requirements. Even a highly functioning
locked-in patient who can speak with an audible voice using braincomputer interface or who can blink to communicate would be legally
unable to modify his advance directive.
Such a person could
communicate with his physicians, make reasoned decisions-he could
even write a bookn'-but in these states he would not be allowed to
change his previously expressed preferences relating to his own
medical treatment.
D. The Principal-Only Approach Violates the ADA
These states arbitrarily deprive a class of people of their right to
make decisions about health care. The three Principal-Only states'
laws do not allow locked-in patients to revoke or modify advance
directives because of their particular difficulties in communication.
This violates the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA").s
A prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA requires: (1)
that the plaintiff has a qualifying disability; (2) "that he is being
denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities for which the
public entity is responsible, or is otherwise discriminated against by
the public entity"; and (3) that the discrimination is founded in the
disability." 9
A locked-in patient qualifies as disabled under the ADA.
Locked-in syndrome qualifies under the "first prong" of ADA
disability because the impairment substantially limits "one or more
major life activities" and the impairment is a "physiological disorder

115. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-109 (2009).
116. Colorado actually provides for the possibility that a declarant might not be able to
sign a directive to execute it and it provides an alternative means of execution. The law
does not provide for such an alternative for revocation. Id.
117. DIVING BELL, supra note 1.

118. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
119. See, e.g., Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 671-72 (5th Cir.
2004).
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or condition" that affects the neurological and musculoskeletal
systems.120

"Major life activities" are defined as "functions such as

caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 2' Locked-in
patients are clearly disabled under the ADA.
ADA Title II protects disabled citizens from discrimination in
"services, programs, and activities" by "public entit[ies]."122 Public
entities, for the purpose of the ADA, include state governments.12
Exactly what constitutes a "service, program, or activity" is broadly
construed.'14 That language is characterized as "a catch-all phrase
that prohibits all discrimination by a public entity, regardless of
context." 12 Specifically, ADA Title II has been construed to cover
many types of state and local governmental regulation. 126 Various
state and local laws have been scrutinized under the ADA and the
Second Circuit advises against "hair-splitting arguments" over what
falls within its reach; state statutes governing advance directives are
within the reach of ADA Title II.1 Therefore, Title II of the ADA
clearly prohibits the discriminatory effect of state laws, including
those that govern advance directives.
Regulations for ADA Title II hold that "[n]o qualified individual
with a disability shall, on the basis of disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any

public entity."

12

8

Specifically,

[a] public entity, in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may
not ... on the basis of disability (i) [d]eny a qualified individual
with a disability the opportunity to participate in or benefit
120.

JOHN PARRY, HANDBOOK ON DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION LAW 10 (2003)

(citing 29 CFR § 1630.2(h)(1)).
121. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2010).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2010).
123. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104.
124.

PARRY, supra note 120.

125. Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1997).
126. Title II covers regulation of leaf burning (See Heather K. by Anita K. v. City of
Mallard, 946 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D. Iowa 1996)), parking regulations (See Duprey v.
Connecticut, 28 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Conn. 19980)), statutes relating to access to medical
records (See Doe v. Stincer, 990 F. Supp. 1427 (S.D. Fla. 1997), vacated on other grounds,
175 F.3d 879 (11th Cir. 1999)), and local zoning decisions (Innovative Health, 117 F.3d at
45).
127. Innovative Health, 117 F.3d at 45.

128. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
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from the aid, benefit, or service; ... [or] (vii) [o]therwise limit a

qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any
right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others
receiving the aid, benefit, or service.
Thus, because locked-in patients' extreme paralysis can prevent
oral communication as wells as make written communication by the
patient impossible, these statutes deny locked-in individuals the
opportunity to revoke or modify their advance directives. The
exclusion of locked-in patients from the benefits of modification and
revocation of advance directives is an exclusion based on their
disabilities-the communicative disability is what prevents them from
validly executing a revocation. As such, the third element of the
prima facie ADA case is fulfilled.
The wording of the statutes in Tennessee, Colorado, and
Maryland prohibit locked-in patients from modifying or revoking
previously executed advance directives. The state laws governing
advance directives are subject to Title II of the ADA. Locked-in
patients are "qualified individual[s] with [] disabilit[ies].""o This
discrimination stems from their communicative disabilities.
Therefore, the prima facie case is fulfilled: These statutes violate the
ADA with respect to people with locked-in syndrome.
This unacceptable curtailment of locked-in patients' rights
regarding previously executed advance directives must be remedied.
The three states with discriminatory statutes should immediately
adopt legislation that conforms to either the Majority or the Third
Party Approach in order to halt this illegal discrimination. Any
argument that alternative approaches imprudently dispense with
formalities should be dismissed as overly dogmatic and as not taking
into account the particular needs of people with communicative
disabilities.

V. Conclusion
The statutes governing revocation of advance directives in
Colorado, Maryland, and Tennessee discriminate against locked-in
patients and must be changed. If those statutes are not changed, a
person with locked-in syndrome in one of those states may not be
able to legally revoke her advance directive, even if the directive
ordered removal of life support. The three Principal-Only states
129. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(b)(1)(i), 35.130(b)(1)(vii).

130. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
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should adopt one of the other two approaches. The Majority
Approach dispenses with all of the formalities of execution, but
makes it easiest for people with severe communicative disabilities to
change or revoke their advance directives.
The Third Party
Approach allows patients to direct another person to revoke or
change the directive; this approach preserves some of the formalities,
but the purposes those formalities serve are mostly lost. Further
complicating the Third Party Approach is the question of whether the
person acting at the direction of the patient must be "in the presence
of" the declarant and how to evaluate "presence" in the context of a
locked-in patient.
Given that the value of the formalities is mostly lost when a third
party executes them, the framework the discriminatory PrincipalOnly jurisdictions should adopt is the Majority Approach. The
Majority Approach allows a person with severe communicative
disability to revoke her directive, without the added difficulty of
directing a third party to act for her. Given the rapid advances being
made in alternative methods of communication for locked-in patients,
allowing revocation by any means of expressing that intent gives the
greatest flexibility to the law.
While locked-in syndrome is a rare condition, advances in
medical science are promising to make its diagnosis somewhat less
uncommon in the future. Coupled with developments in technology
that aid in communication with people who have lost the ability to
speak, write, or communicate by any traditional method, the more
accurate diagnostic procedures bring to light a class of people who
can and should be making important health care decisions, but are
now hindered only by the law. Colorado, Maryland, and Tennessee
should change their laws governing revocation of advance directives
before the scenarios described in this paper become a real life-ordeath situation for a real person.

